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Bargaining merger terms and the effect on the
announcement returns
1 Introduction
The motivations that govern merger and acquisitions (M&A) decisions are well estab-
lished in the literature. Typically, when merging, firms look for gains related to operat-
ing efficiencies (e.g.: economies of scale), increased market power, economies by vertical
integration, technology transfers, among others.1 These gains are generally presented in
the form of synergies.
However, since the final outcome of a merger process is usually uncertain, companies
may have an incentive to delay the decision, waiting for a given optimal timing. Recent
literature addresses this topic, following the real options theory. For instance, Lambrecht
(2004) studies the timing of mergers motivated by economies of scale, and Thijssen (2008)
addresses the timing when both efficiency gains and diversification benefits are considered.
The optimal timing (or strategic timing) appears also in Alvarez and Stenbacka (2006),
Lambrecht and Myers (2007), Hackbarth and Morellec (2008), and in Bernile et al. (2012).
Another important issue regarding M&A is how the merger potential gains are split
among the intervening firms. The split of potential gains is defined by the exchange
terms of the merger, which is proposed by the acquiring firm and negotiated by both
firms. Some literature discusses what drives the definition of the terms, how they can
be determined and the effects on the value of merging firms. For instance, Lambrecht
(2004) defines a two-round process where firstly the firms agree about the timing of the
merger, maximizing the overall merger gains, and then the merger terms are defined as
those that induce both firms to merge at this efficient threshold. A similar approach
appears in Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) and Hackbarth and Morellec (2008). The terms
of the merger play an important role in these papers, since they are the unique solutions
that ensure that the firms agree on the efficient timing. Accordingly, the timing of the
merger and the exchange terms seem to be closely related.
However, differently from the related literature, our paper suggests that the timing
and the terms are not necessarily linked. In fact, our approach shows that the firms agree
1Zhu et al. (2017) study a particular case where mergers may occur even in the absence of economies
of scale, namely, in the context of banking industry, when the merger is driven by the incentive of gaining
the too-big-to-fail status.
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about the timing independently from how merger synergies are split, namely as a result
of their bargaining power. The merger terms and the bargaining power are not needed to
align firms behavior with the efficient threshold, suggesting that some other factors may
explain how the surplus is shared. This result is obtained by relaxing the assumption
that the merged firm is split between the intervening firms in fixed shares, independently
from the relative value of firms before merging, which we argue is more realistic.
Related to our work is Banerjee et al. (2014), where firms negotiate the timing and
then bargain the sharing rule. In their approach, as in Thijssen (2008), the bargaining
power is assumed constant and exogenously given. Relaxing this assumption, we suggest
that the bargaining power should depend on the value of the firms. As we will see,
the sharing rule, instead of being an indirect measure of the bargaining power, turns to
assume a direct correspondence with it. In such a context, Banerjee et al. (2014) becomes
a special case of our model. Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) and Lambrecht (2004) are also
special cases where bargaining power is determined by the firm’s relative exercise costs.
The independence of timing and terms has important implications on how the market
reacts to a merger announcement. In fact, the market formulates expectations on both
the amount of synergies, that determines the timing, and the merger terms, which may
depend, namely, on the relative negotiating power (bargaining power) of each firm, that
can be influenced by takeover defenses, termination fees, and stock ownership, among
others.
We show that some of the mixed results regarding the announcement returns of merger
and acquisitions can be explained in the context of our model under asymmetry of infor-
mation. In efficient markets, abnormal returns can only be explained by new information
conveyed by the announcement. The announcement reveals information to the market
about the merger gains or synergies and the merger terms, i.e how synergies will be split
between the firms (Barraclough et al. 2013). Under asymmetry of information, the market
can only form expectations about these parameter values, adjusting share prices depend-
ing on the (lack of) occurrence of a merger announcement. This process of incorporating
information into share prices, can explain all sorts of abnormal returns, as computed
using the event studies methodology. Incomplete information has also been considered
before, in a dynamic mergers model by Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), who suggest that
it plays a role in explaining positive announcement returns and a return run-up prior to
the announcement. However, they can only explain negative abnormal returns for target
firms introducing multiple competing bidders in the model. In our model, imperfect infor-
mation is the only ingredient needed to produce negative and positive abnormal returns,
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for both firms.
We consider two settings for the asymmetry of information. In the first setting, asym-
metry of information between the managers of both firms and the market can produce
positive or negative abnormal returns for both the bidder and the target. Following Ak-
tas et al. (2010) we show how our model is capable of explaining why bidder-initiated
mergers produce higher bid premiums. In the second setting, by considering asymmet-
ric information between the informed bidder manager and optimistic investors, we argue
that our model can explain the prediction of the timing theory of merger waves suggested
by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Under this theory, in-
formed bidder managers, acting rationally, take advantage of the relative overvaluation
of the firm to engage in mergers, using stock rather than cash as means of payment, and
generate abnormal announcement returns in “hot” markets.
We also show that abnormal announcement returns can also occur under perfect
information, even if the announcement is expected by the market. Return run-ups or
run-downs prior to the merger are expected depending on the type of the merger payoff.
In this case the event-study methodology suggests that an unexpected return is observed,
but it is simply the result of the natural dynamics of the state-variables.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic model to obtain the
merger timing. Section 3 discusses the determinants of mergers terms. Section 4 shows
that asymmetric information can explain the empirical mixed results on the announce-
ment abnormal returns and also shows that they can occur under perfect information.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The timing of mergers
Let us assume that two firms, i and j, have the irreversible option to merge into a single
firm benefiting from synergies. The value of the stand-alone firms, the merged firm and
synergies, depend all on a single source of uncertainty, x, that behaves according to a
geometric Brownian motion:
dx = µxdt+ σxdw (1)
where µ < r, σ, and dw are, respectively, the drift under the risk-neutral measure, the
volatility, and the increment of a Wiener process. r is the constant risk-free interest rate.
When firms merge, they combine their activities and a merger surplus, α(x), is pro-
duced. The stand-alone firms’ value is Vi(x) and Vj(x). The value of the merged firm is
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VM(x) = Vi(x) + Vj(x) + α(x), which is shared by both firms: fraction γi to firm i and
1− γi for the other firm.2
Therefore, the payoff of merging for firm i is:
Πi(x) = γiVM(x)− Vi(x)−Ki (2)
and for firm j:
Πi(x) = (1− γi)VM(x)− Vj(x)−Kj (3)
where Ki and Kj are sunk costs incurred by each firm.




[γiVM(x)− Vi(x)−Ki]ηi(x) [(1− γi)VM(x)− Vj(x)−Kj]1−ηi(x) (4)
where η(x) is the bargaining power as a function of the state variable. Notice that, in
contrast to Banerjee et al. (2014), the bargaining power in now non-constant, varying
with x.
The solution for the value maximization problem is:
γi(x) =
Vi(x) +Ki + ηi(x)(α(x)−Ki −Kj)
VM(x)
(5)
Plugging the solution for γi(x) into Equation (2) and simplifying, we get the merger
payoffs:
Πi(x) = ηi(x)π(x) (6)
Πj(x) = (1− ηi(x))π(x) (7)
where π(x) = α(x)−K is the net surplus of the merger, and K = Ki+Kj is the aggregate
sunk cost. Notice that the outcome of the bargaining game is essentially a discussion on
how to share the merger surplus. The bargaining power will determine the stake each
firm gets from the surplus produced by the merger. In other words, the merger terms
(γi(x)) can be mapped from the bargaining power (ηi(x)).
Previous models have assumed that the merged firm is split between the two firms in
2As in Banerjee et al. (2014), a cash transfer can be also included, but the main results hold.
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fixed shares, independently from the relative value of firms before merging. For instance,
in the Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) model, the state variable is precisely the stochastic
relative value of the firms. This assumption allowed them to endogenously obtain the
merger terms. These models assume that when a firm is considering to merge for a certain
level x, and compares the payoff with the so-called continuation value, it assumes that
merging later cannot change the merger terms or the bargaining power. On the contrary,
in our setting the bargaining game produces merger terms that are not constant.
After bargaining for the terms, firms decide on the optimal timing to exercise the
option to merge. Following standard procedures (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) any perpetual
option on x, Oi(x), must satisfy the following ordinary differential equation:
1
2
σ2x2O′′(x) + µxO′(x)− rO(x) = 0 (8)







where ν+ and ν− are the solutions to the fundamental quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2ν(ν − 1) + µν − r = 0 (10)
The merger payoff π(x) can accommodate a wide variety of merger surpluses for which
it is possible to obtain an optimal merger timing with appropriate value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions for O(x). Let us assume, for now, that π(x) is strictly increas-
ing/decreasing in R+ and has a zero. For instance when a merger produces economies
of scale and requires a sunk cost, a simple possible payoff would be π(x) = αx −K. In
this case the merger option would be equivalent to a call option. If a merger allows the
merged firm to divest some assets in exchange for a fixed salvage value, the payoff can be
modeled as π(x) = K − αx, meaning that the merger option is similar to a put option.
When analyzing the option to merge, each firm must consider the optimal behavior
of the other firm, i.e. what are the terms that the other firm requires in order to agree
merging for different values of x. Firm i considers the fraction of the merger surplus
(π(x)) that the other firm, j, is willing to concede (ηi(x)), such that every x is an optimal
3Please notice that both A+ and A− are positive, with + and − denoting the association with the
respective sign of ν.
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merger trigger.4 The value of the option to merge for firm j (Oj(x)), with a bargaining




ν± = (1− ηi(x)) π(x) (11)
ν±A±j x
ν±−1 = (1− ηi(x)) π′(x)− η′i(x)π(x) (12)
where ηi(x) is firm i share of the merger surplus that firm j is willing to concede. Please
notice that we require every x to be an optimal trigger, and so these boundary conditions
must be valid to every x, an not only for a single trigger (x∗) as in standard models.
Given that the payoff is determined by ηi(x), this function can be defined in order to
allow every x to become a trigger for investment.
These boundary conditions can be reduced to the following differential equation, which
ηi(x) must solve:
xπ(x)η′i(x) + xπ
′(x)ηi(x)− ν±π(x)ηi(x)− xπ′(x) + ν±π(x) = 0 (13)
Proposition 1. The value of the option to merge for firm j, that makes it indifferent to
merge for any x is:
Oj(x) = Cjx
ν± (14)
where Cj > 0 is an exogenous parameter that influences the bargaining power, and the
























Firm i must now consider ηi(x) in its decision to merge. Taking into consideration
ηi(x) given by Equation (15), in Equation (6), firm i receives the following payoff on
4Note that, as shown before, the merger terms are the result of the bargaining power ηi(x), or,
equivalently, the sharing rule of the merger surplus.
5As 0 ⩽ ηi(x) ⩽ 1, Cj must be in the following interval: 0 ⩽ Cj ⩽ π(x)xν± .
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merging at x = xi:
Πij(xi) = π(xi)− Cjxiν
±
(17)
where ij denotes the case when firm i incorporates firm j required terms.
Proposition 2. The value of the option to merge for firm i, taking into account the










for x < x∗i
Πij(x) for x
∗








for x ⩾ x∗∗i
(18)
where




a. For strictly increasing merger payoffs,
x∗i is the solution to the following equation:
ν+π(x∗i )− π′(x∗i )x∗i = 0, (20)
x∗∗i is the solution to the following nonlinear equation:
ν−π(x∗∗i )− π′(x∗∗i )x∗∗i − ν−Cjx∗∗i
ν+ = 0. (21)
b. For strictly decreasing merger payoffs,
x∗i is the solution to the following nonlinear equation:
ν+π(x∗i )− π′(x∗i )x∗i − ν+Cjx∗i
ν− = 0, (22)
x∗∗i is the solution to the following equation:
ν−π(x∗∗i )− π′(x∗∗i )x∗∗i = 0. (23)
Firm i will be willing to merge when x crosses x∗i from below. If, for any circumstance,
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the first observation of x occurs at a higher level, merging will only be optimal for x < x∗∗i .
This second trigger is relevant if the starting value of x is above x∗∗i , and merging becomes
optimal when x crosses x∗∗i from above.
For strictly increasing merger payoffs, the only meaningful trigger is x∗i (Equation
(20)), as it can be shown that at the other trigger (x∗∗i ), mergers are not possible, because
the two firms will not agree on the merger terms. For strictly decreasing payoffs the
relevant trigger is x∗∗i (Equation (23)).
The most relevant characteristic of the solution is that the timing of mergers (Equa-
tions (20) and (23)) is independent of the bargaining power (ηi(x)) or, equivalently, the
merger terms (γi(x)). Both firms agree to merge in the same timing, but the terms of
the merger are not determined endogenously by the parameters that explain the trigger
for merging.
Another relevant characteristic is that, depending on the type of merger payoff, merg-
ers can be pro-cyclical, in the case of mergers induced by economies of scale or market
power gains, and can occur in recessions, when motivated by divestment options, for
instance. More generally, a merger surplus can even be an ”U-shaped” concave or an
inverted ”U-shaped” convex function, for which there are two trigger values of x that
induce mergers. For concave payoffs, mergers occur for intermediate values of the state
variable, and for convex payoffs, mergers occur for the outer values of the state variable,
and firms wait for the intermediate values.
The individual firms’ maximizing behavior is now compared to a central planner’s
decision.
Proposition 3. The trigger for merging of the individual firms is the same as that of a
central planner maximizing the overall payoff ΠC(x) = π(x).
Proposition 3 shows that the solutions of previous models (e.g.: Lambrecht (2004),
Morellec and Zhdanov (2005)) are obtained in our setting, since they show that the
individual firms’ timing is also the central planner’s timing. However, in their models the
merger terms are endogenous and unique. In other words they need to find the terms
that align the individual behavior with that of the central planner, whereas, in our case,
the alignment is a natural result of the individual firms’ optimal decisions.
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3 The merger terms
In the related literature the terms of the merger are usually endogenously determined,
i.e. the terms result as part of the global solution.
Lambrecht (2004) defines a two round procedure where parties first negotiate and
agree about the timing, and then decide how to share the new company. In the first
round the author assumes that it is in the best interest of each firm to merge at the
central planner trigger. In the second round they agree on the terms that induce both
to exercise the merger option at that optimal timing. In doing so, he assumes that those
terms are constant over time and are independent of the state variables. In this model,
the post-merging shareholding is unique and is a function of the stock of capital of each
firm and the merger costs. Our model differs from this model in two important aspects.
First, we do not need to impose the restriction that the firms must ex ante agree to merge
on the central planner trigger. The central planner solution arises as the result of the
equilibrium strategies of each firm. Second, we show that there are multiple acceptable
sharing rules.
The approach of Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) is different. First, firms compute their
own optimal merger timing, and then the sharing rule is found as the unique solution
that ensures both firms agree on the timing. They conclude that the timing is the
same as the central planner solution. Although their model is different from Lambrecht
(2004), if their procedure is used for the same model setting, it is straightforward to
show that the solution is exactly the same. Differently from our model, the merger terms
are unrealistically assumed to be constant and independent of the state variable, which
produces an unique sharing rule, in contrast to the multiple viable sharing rules in our
model.
Thijssen (2008) assumes that the share of the merged firm is a function of the state
variables. However, in his model the timing and terms are obtained endogenously, being
a function of each other. In our model they are independent. His model produces a single
sharing rule, while in our model multiple solutions may exist. Using a Nash bargaining
single stage game, he shows that the option value completely disappears and the timing is
independent of the bargaining power. This results from the assumption that disagreement
point of the game is such that the firm becomes a target and obtains a null merge payoff.
Alvarez and Stenbacka (2006) also assume that the merger terms are determined through
Nash bargaining. The exogenous constant bargaining power determines the merger terms.
The observation of the merger terms is however extremely difficult, if not impossible.
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In perfect markets, the shares in the merged firm are exactly the relative values of the
firms before merging. The value of each firm before merging already includes the merger
option value, i.e. a given expectation about the sharing rule of the merger surplus. The
occurrence of any abnormal return can be explained as the result of a surprise to the
market, either in terms of timing or the sharing rule of the merger surplus. However even
under perfect information the return dynamics resulting from the option exercise can
also explain the abnormal returns. We study these possible explanations in the following
section.
4 Explaining the announcement abnormal returns
The majority of the literature on mergers and acquisitions traditionally reports empirical
evidence showing positive returns for target firms and negative (or zero) returns for the
shareholders of the acquirers (Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989),
Andrade et al. (2001), Eckbo (2009), and Lin et al. (2011)). Value-loss for the acquiring
shareholder is also reported by Moeller et al. (2005) for large deals in the late 90’s.
Recent studies suggest mixed results. Martynova and Renneboog (2011) show evi-
dence of positive abnormal returns for both parties, significant for the targets, but only
slightly positive for the bidder (previously, similar results appear in Bradley et al. (1988)).
Barraclough et al. (2013) shows mixed signs for the returns, depending on the base price
used in the analysis. However, the results indicate that the returns of the bidding firms
are relatively small when compared with the returns of the target. In a different approach,
opposite evidence is reported by Ahern (2012), where the average gains for target firms
are only modestly larger than the gains obtained by the acquirers.
Different explanations for the realized abnormal returns have been suggested in the
literature. Some of the arguments are: the relative size of the firms (e.g. Moeller et al.
(2004)), the existence of information asymmetry (e.g. Moeller et al. (2007)), the success
of the offer (e.g. Barraclough et al. (2013)), the rivalry of the merging firms (e.g. Song
and Walkling (2000)), the form of payment (e.g. Gao (2011) and Barraclough et al.
(2013)), and the nature (public or private) of the target firm (e.g. Fuller et al. (2002)),
among others.
In the context of the model herein presented, we follow the information asymmetry
argument of Moeller et al. (2007). However, we show that, even for the case of perfect in-
formation, abnormal returns produced by merger announcements can be explained, albeit
the announcement is expected by the market. Previously Hackbarth and Morellec (2008)
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have shown that the dynamics of the firm-level betas change in the period surrounding
the announcement. In their model the betas change depending on the relative betas of
the bidder and target firms and a run-up or run-down of betas are both possible. We
also show that a return run-up or run-down is also possible in the case of a single factor
model, simply depending on the type of the merger payoff.
Under information asymmetry, the abnormal returns are driven by the adjustment of
prices to the information revealed by the announcement. In line with Barraclough et al.
(2013), the announcement informs the market about both the merger gains (synergies)
and the merger terms (how the synergies will be split between the firms shareholders).
The market can only form expectations about this relevant piece of information, adjusting
immediately the share prices once it becomes public. We show that this adjustment can
produce all types of abnormal returns, depending on shareholders’ prior assessment about
the merger gains and the bargaining power of the managers.
4.1 Abnormal returns under perfect information
Under perfect information, the market anticipates the merger terms and timing. The
merger announcement does not produce any price change. However, the exercise of the
option to merge alters the return and risk dynamics.
The announcement effects are traditionally computed using the event study method-
ology, under which the return (R) during the event window around the announcement
date is measured against the expected return (R̂), that is calculated using a given esti-
mation window prior to the event. The abnormal return (AR) is simply R − R̂.6 It is
therefore important to know how the returns behave during those windows.7
Before the merger, the value dynamics of firm i, Fi(x), depends on the assets-in-place
and the option to merge:
dFi(x) = dVi(x) + dOi(x) (24)
After the merger, the firm value dynamics is only a function of the assets-in-place:
dFM(x) = dVM(x) (25)
6Please note that the absence of any abnormal return does not mean that there are no synergies. It
simply means that the market is able to anticipate and incorporate in the prices both the synergies and
the merger terms.
7The asset pricing implications of the exercise of real options have been studied before (Berk et al.
1999, 2004, Carlson et al. 2004, 2006, 2010, Cooper 2006, Hackbarth and Morellec 2008, Zhang 2005).
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The returns depend on the functional form of both the assets in place and the option
to merge. Let us assume that the assets-in-place value has the following functional form:
Vi(x) = ϕix
θ (26)
where ϕi > 0 and θ ⩾ 1.
This general function encompasses the Lambrecht (2004) model (θ > 1), and Morellec
and Zhdanov (2005) and Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) models (θ = 1). Also for the sake
of simplicity, let us assume that the merger surplus is strictly increasing or decreasing,





Furthermore we assume that the assets-in-place are less risky than the call option to
merge, i.e. θ < ν+, which also occurs in Lambrecht (2004).
Proposition 4. The overall return of the firm value prior to the merger is:
Rt<τ = µV +
Oi(x)
Fi(x)





θ(θ − 1)σ2 (29)
µO = r + ν
±(µ− r) (30)
and after merging:
Rt>τ = µV (31)
where τ denotes the first time the trigger for merging is hit.
The comparison of returns before (Rt<τ ) and after (Rt>τ ) the merger allows us to
state the following:
Corollary 1. The average return before the merger is higher (lower) than the return after
the merger for a merger surplus strictly increasing (decreasing) in the state variable x,
which means that, under perfect information, the announcement of a merger in expansions
(recessions) produces negative (positive) abnormal returns.
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The return before the merger is a weighted average of the assets-in-place and option
returns. When the option to merge is a call option, the return of the option is higher
than the assets-in-place return. We expect to observe a run-up in the returns, as we
approach the trigger for the merger. When the merger occurs, the exercise of the call
option reduces the return to the assets-in-place return. The event study methodology
will suggest a negative abnormal return since the return in the event window is lower
that the expected return (R < R̂). On the contrary, when the option to merge is a put
option, we will observe a run-down in the returns prior to the merger and a jump to the
assets-in-place return when the trigger is reached, producing a positive abnormal return.
Corollary 2. As we approach the trigger for the merger it is expected to observe a return
run-up (run-down) when the option to merge is a call (put) option.
A similar result appears in Hackbarth and Morellec (2008), but for the firm-level
betas, that change depending on the relative betas of the bidder and target firms when
the merger is a call option. We show that, in the case of a single factor model, a run-up
or run-down in returns is also possible, according to the type of the merger payoff.
4.2 Abnormal returns under asymmetric information
Let us consider the asymmetry of information in two different contexts. Firstly, the
asymmetric information between the merging firms and the market, where the managers
of both firms have all the relevant information about the synergies, while the market
is only able to form some expectation about the level of those synergies. As we will
see, depending on market’s over(under)estimation of the synergies, combined negative
(positive) abnormal returns can be expected. Secondly, in line with Shleifer and Vishny
(2003) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), we assume a more severe asymmetric information
setting, where only the bidder knows the true synergy, while the target shares the market’s
optimistic prospects about the merger synergies and bidder’s value.
4.2.1 Asymmetric information between the firms and the market
Let us assume that the managers of merging firms have private information about the
synergies. The market can only form expectations about the value of synergies, (π̂(x))
that translate into an expected trigger for the merger (x̂∗), and an expected bargaining
power (η̂i), or the equivalent merger terms (γ̂i), that do not affect the trigger as shown
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before. The announcement of the merger reveals both the synergies and the terms nego-
tiated by the managers, and the market will react correcting its expectations based on
this new piece of information. Let us consider the two possible cases where either the
market overestimates or underestimates the synergies.
Case 1: The market overestimates the synergies
Assume that the market (continuously) overestimates the synergies, pushing the expected
trigger of the merger to a level that it is below the true merger trigger (x̂∗ < x∗). If x
hits x̂∗ and the merger is not announced, the market incorporates the information and
updates its expectation, decreasing the level of expected synergies, that however remain
overestimated. This process of updating the expectations about the synergies continues
as the state-variable x increases in value (the market extracts information of the absence
of a merger announcement) until the moment when the merger is finally announced at
the optimal moment.
Notice that, due to this continuous update process, the merger will happen at the
moment expected by the market, producing no surprise. In fact, the announcement
only confirms what was the market expectations about the synergies at that particular
moment, and so no price update occurs for synergies.
For the firms as a whole, and for the reasons presented in section 4.1, a combined
negative (positive) abnormal return is expected for call (put) type of mergers.
However, in addition to the true synergies, the announcement also reveals to the
market the terms of the merger, i.e., how the merger surplus will be shared between
the two firms. This sharing rule results from a negotiation between the managers of
each firm and will depend on their (relative) bargaining power. Accordingly, the merger
announcement also reveals the true γi, which can be different (or not) from the one
expected by the market (γ̂i).
It is easy to see that in case of γi = γ̂i, the abnormal return of each firm will be
similar to the combined abnormal return (negative for mergers like calls and positive for
merger like puts). However, in all other cases, particularly when one firms unexpectedly
captures relatively more (less) synergies than the other, a positive (negative) surprise in
γi can produce a final positive (larger negative) abnormal return to the firm.
All possible signs for the abnormal returns appear in Table 1:
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Call option Put option
Firm 1 Firm 2 Comb. Firm 1 Firm 2 Comb.
Smaller γ1 − +/− − +/− + +
Expected γ1 − − − + + +
Larger γ1 +/− − − + +/− +
Table 1: Summary of the announcement returns in the case of an overestimation of
synergies by the market. γ1 stands for the share of the merged firm accruing
to firm 1.
Case 2: The market underestimates synergies
Let us now analyze the case where the market underestimates the synergies. When
this happens, since the trigger expected by the market is higher than the true merger
trigger (x̂∗ > x∗), the announcement always reveals to be a surprise for the market,
due to the higher (than expected) merger synergies. Naturally, stocks prices will react
positively to this new information. For sufficiently high revealed synergies, the combined
abnormal return can become positive, compensating the natural effect of the event study
methodology (section 4.1).
Combining the effects of the merger terms revealed at the announcement, Table 2
presents all possible signs for the abnormal returns in the case of a market underestimation
of the synergies:
Call option Put option
Firm 1 Firm 2 Comb. Firm 1 Firm 2 Comb.
Smaller γ1 +/− +/− +/− +/− + +
Expected γ1 +/− +/− +/− + + +
Larger γ1 +/− +/− +/− + +/− +
Table 2: Summary of the announcement returns in the case of an underestimation of
synergies by the market. γ1 stands for the share of the merged firm accruing
to firm 1.
Further analysis of the two cases
When the option to merge is a call option, the announcement produces returns that can
be positive or negative, depending on the combination of the effects of the difference
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in returns prior e post merger (negative effect) and the surprise in the announcement
(positive effect). When the asymmetry of information on the synergies is small, the
surprise effect may not be sufficient to overcome the return effect, making more likely
the negative announcement returns. These negative effects can be offset by the positive
effect of a larger than expected share of the synergies captured by one of the firms. The
combined value-weighted return present mixed results.
When the option to merge is a put option, the announcement produces positive ab-
normal returns for both firms (from both the returns and surprise effects). A lower than
expected share of the synergies reduces the abnormal return, and it can become negative
for the firm that captures a smaller than expected share. For this case, the combined
return is always positive.
Notice that since in our model the roles of bidder and target are not endogenously
determined, we can explain positive, null and negative abnormal returns for both firms.
Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) have also proposed a real options model where incom-
plete information of the market regarding the parameters of the merger plays a role in
explaining positive announcement returns and a return run-up prior to the announcement.
However, they can only explain negative abnormal returns for target firms introducing
multiple competing bidders in the model. In our model, imperfect information is the only
ingredient necessary to produce negative and positive abnormal returns, for both firms.
Furthermore, and contrary to their proposition, a negative combined effect is possible in
the case of call options, if the surprise effect is not sufficient to overcome the return effect.
Our model can also explain the results suggested by recent literature, revealing that
the deal initiation is important for the premiums paid by the bidders.8 Masulis and
Simsir (2015) show that bidders initiate 63% of the mergers, while targets initiate the
remaining 37%. According to Aktas et al. (2010) targets receive lower premiums when
they initiate the deal compared with bidder-initiated ones.
As suggested by Aktas et al. (2010), when the target initiates the deal, it signals a
willingness to sell, resulting in a weaker bargaining power. In our setting, this translates
into a smaller than expected γ, which results in lower premiums for the target, as well
as higher premiums for the bidder, as reported by Aktas et al. (2010) and Masulis and
Simsir (2015). On the other hand, a bidder-initiated deal induces him to offer higher
premiums to the target in order to prevent competition from other bidders (Fishman
8Our model deals with friendly mergers, where the role of each firm (i.e. being a bidder or target) is
not explicitly addressed. Please refer to Chen and Wang (2015) for a dynamic model where the initiation
roles are endogenous.
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1988), which in our setting means an unexpected higher γ for the target, i.e. a higher
premium.
4.2.2 Asymmetric information between the bidder and all other participants
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) propose a market timing
theory for merger waves, arguing that investors’ optimism, leading to the misvaluation
of bidders and merger synergies, drives merger waves in “hot” market periods. The
informed bidder managers, acting rationally, take advantage of the relative overvaluation
of the firm to engage in mergers, using stock rather than cash as means of payment.
This theory assumes that the bidder managers know the true value of the firm and the
merger synergies, but all other participants (including the target) overestimate them,
and stick to their beliefs in the short run, even when the announcement occurs. Ang and
Cheng (2006) show that during the hot periods, overvalued firms prefer equity to cash as
means of payment in mergers. Rosen (2006) also finds evidence that mergers announced
in “hot” markets outperform in the short-run those announced in “cold” markets. The
explanation offered is consistent with the investor sentiment playing an important role,
with optimistic investors reacting favorably to merger announcements.
In our setting, the market overpricing of the bidder value, allows him to claim a
higher share in the merged firm (Equation (5)). It can also be argued that, because the
target aligns with the market the overoptimism about the bidder value, it concedes a
higher bargaining power to the bidder, therefore capturing a smaller share of the merger
surplus. The bidder managers, who have the true knowledge about the firm and syn-
ergies valuation, fearing a market correction, have an incentive to anticipate a merger
announcement. As suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) they can even enter into
non-synergistic mergers, just to take advantage of the misvaluation of firms. Delaying
the decision to merge can be costly to the bidder, as it can lose the advantage of the
overvaluation. While the suboptimal merger timing reduces the true overall merger sur-
plus, the theory assumes that the market does not recognize that in the short run. An
abnormal positive return, similar to that of case 2 of the previous section, is produced
when the manager announces a merger sooner than expected by the market, because the




This paper develops a dynamic real options model for the timing and terms of mergers,
extending and generalizing previous models, both under perfect and asymmetric infor-
mation. The main results and empirical insights are summarized below.
First, under perfect information, we show that firms always agree on the merger timing
independently from how the surplus is shared between firms, and this timing is shown
to be the same as that of a central planner. Contrary to most of the previous related
models, the terms are shown not to be unique, and must depend on some exogenous
factor, namely the bargaining power of each firm. The determinants of the mergers terms
are therefore central for explaining how the market reacts to the announcement of the
merger.
Second, under perfect information, abnormal returns, as measured using the event-
study methodology, can be produced by merger announcements, even if they are expected
by the market. We also show that return run-ups or run-downs are expected depending
on the type of the merger payoff. In this case the event-study methodology suggests that
an unexpected return is observed, while the natural dynamics of the state-variables is
sufficient to explain the results.
Third, under asymmetry of information between managers and the market, the merger
announcement also produce abnormal returns, resulting from surprises both in the merger
timing and the merger terms. Negative or positive abnormal returns are possible for each
firm, consistent with the empirical evidence.
Further research could also consider the effect of managers compensation along with
takeover incentives and defenses.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Using a compact notation for the strictly increasing and decreas-
ing payoffs, the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions form firm j are:
A±j x
ν± = (1− ηi(x))π(x) (32)
ν±A±j x
ν±−1 = (1− ηi(x))π′(x)− η′i(x)π(x) (33)
Reducing to a single equation, ηi(x) is the solution to the following differential equation:
xπ(x)η′i(x) + xπ







where Cj is an exogenous constant.
Replacing in Equation (11), the value of the option to merge for firm j becomes:
Oj(x) = Cjx
ν± (36)
and, therefore, Cj > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given that ν+ > 0, ν− < 0, ηi(x) < 1, and Cj > 0, limx→+∞ Πij(x) =
−∞, and limp→0 Πij(x) < 0. The option value Oij(x) must be non-negative, and therefore





the general solution (9) can not be set to 0, and Oij(x) is a concave function, producing




ν+ for x < x∗i
Πij(x) for x
∗
i ⩽ x < x∗∗i
A−ijx
ν− for x ⩾ x∗∗i
(37)











ν+−1 = π′(x)− ν+Cjx∗i
ν+−1 (39)
Solving these two equations, we obtain x∗i :
ν+π(x∗i )− π′(x∗i )x∗i = 0 (40)









ν−−1 = π′(x)− ν+Cjx∗i
ν+−1 (42)
x∗∗i is the solution to the following nonlinear equation:
ν−π(x∗∗i )− π′(x∗∗i )x∗∗i − ν−Cjx∗∗i
ν+ = 0. (43)










ν+−1 = π′(x)− ν+Cjx∗i
ν−−1 (45)
x∗i is the solution to the following nonlinear equation:
ν+π(x∗i )− π′(x∗i )x∗i − ν+Cjx∗i
ν− = 0. (46)









ν−−1 = π′(x)− ν+Cjx∗i
ν−−1 (48)
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Solving these two equations, we obtain x∗∗i :
ν−π(x∗∗i )− π′(x∗∗i )x∗∗i = 0 (49)










in the second equation:
ν±π(xp)− π′(xp)xp = 0 (52)
For a merger payoff resembling a call option (ν+), xp = x∗, and for the case of a put
option (ν−), xp = x∗∗.
Proof of Proposition 4. The dynamics of the value of the assets-in-place, for a general









For a value of the functional form Vi(x) = ϕix
θ, this reduces to:
dVi(x) =
(





The diffusion process of the value of option to merge, prior to the expected merger
timing, under the real measure, is given by:9
dOi(x) =
(





















From the fundamental quadratic Equation (10) we obtain Equation (55).
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The overall value dynamics prior to the merger is:
dFi(x) =
((






























r + ν±(µ− r)
)
(57)
where τ denotes the first time the trigger for merging is hit.
Equation (57) simplifies to:
Rt<τ = µV +
Oi(x)
Fi(x)
(µO − µV ) (58)
where
µV = θ(µ− δ) +
1
2
θ(θ − 1)σ2 (59)
µO = r + ν
±(µ− r) (60)
Proof of Corollary 1. From Equations (59) and (60):
µO − µV = r + ν±(µ− r)− θ(µ− δ)−
1
2
θ(θ − 1)σ2 (61)
Additionally from the fundamental quadratic Equation (10) and since ν+ > θ
1
2
σ2θ(θ − 1) < r − µθ (62)
Combining Equations (61) and (62):





which for a call option (ν+) is always positive, and for a put option (ν−) is always
negative.
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ϕxθ + A±i x
ν±
)2 (65)
For a call option (A+ > 0 and ν+ > 1), and given ν+ > θ, as we approach the trigger
from below, the weight of the option increases (the derivative is positive), producing an
increase in the overall return. We expect, therefore, to observe a return run-up prior to
the merger.
For a put option (A− > 0 and ν− < 0), as we approach the trigger from above
(decreasing in x), the weight of the option also increases (the derivative is negative), but
now produces a decrease in the overall return, given that the put option has lower return
than the assets-in-place. We expect, therefore, to observe a return run-down prior to the
merger.
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